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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AFTER PURKETT
V. ELEM, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995): HOW TO JUDGE A BOOK BY ITS COVER
WITHOUT VIOLATING EQUAL PROTECTION.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, trial lawyers enjoyed the right to strike limited numbers
of the venire without cause.' A peremptory challenge,2 as opposed to a
challenge for cause,3 is based on a lawyer's subjective decision that a
particular juror will be biased against the result desired by the lawyer in the
case at hand.' Unfortunately, bias itself often influences the subjectivity of
the lawyer and leads to strikes based on certain characteristics of the
targeted juror.'
Purkett v. Elem6 marks a recent Supreme Court attempt to further
define Batson v. Kentucky,7 the Court's landmark decision prohibiting
purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection to prevent violation of a
criminal defendant's right to equal protection.8 In Purkett, the Court found
that a peremptory challenge based on a juror's long, unkempt hair,
mustache, and beard satisfied the prosecution's burden of articulating a
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenge.9 The Court reasoned that this
step of the Batson process does not require a persuasive or even plausible
1. At early common law, both prosecutors and defendants were allowed to strike jurors
from the venire without cause. Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLIAMETTE L. REv. 293, 296-97 (1989). So
strong was the tradition that despite a 1305 statute requiring prosecutors to show cause for
strikes, courts allowed prosecutors to use peremptory challenges through the practice of
"standing jurors aside." Id. at 297. Thus, peremptory challenges became the law in England
and were later adopted by American common law. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213-16
(1965) (providing a detailed history of the peremptory challenge).
2. Peremptory challenge is defined as the "right to challenge a juror without assigning,
or being required to assign a reason for the challenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an
action, both civil and criminal, has a specified number of such challenges and after using all
his peremptory challenges he is required to furnish a reason for subsequent challenges."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Challenge for cause is defined as a "request from a party to a judge that a certain
prospective juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes or
reasons." Id. at 230.
4. Nancy J. Cutler, J.E.B. v, Alabama Ex Rel. T.B.: Excellent Ideology, Ineffective
Implementation, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 503, 505-06 (1995).
5. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965) (noting that peremptory challenges.
are "often exercised upon the sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt
to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another' [as well as on grounds of]... race,
religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.") (quoting
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)).
6. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam).
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 682 (8th Cir. 1994).
9. Purkett, 115 S, Ct. at 1771.
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explanation.'" Indeed, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral unless
the prosecutor's explanation inherently implies a discriminatory intent."
Part two of this note examines the facts and procedural history of the
Purkett decision, and part three briefly describes the development of
peremptory challenges as an area of constitutional scrutiny. Part four
analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Purkett, and part
five explores the significance of the decision.
II. FACTS
In July of 1986 a Missouri state court jury convicted Jimmy Elem of
second degree robbery.' 2 Elem, who is black, objected to the prosecutor's
use of peremptory challenges to strike two black males (jurors 22 and 24)
from the jury panel. 3 While proffering no authority, Elem presumably
based his objection on Batson v. Kentucky.'4
Responding to defense objections to the challenges, the prosecutor first
cited hair style as the primary reason for striking juror 22 from the panel. 5
In addition, both jurors 22 and 24 wore mustaches and goatee-type beards
which made them look "suspicious" to the prosecutor.' 6 The prosecutor
further explained that juror 24 was challenged because a man pointed a
sawed-off shotgun at him during a supermarket robbery. 7 Because no gun
was involved in Elem's case, the prosecutor feared that juror 24 might be
unreliable if he felt that a robbery necessarily required a gun. 8
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Elem, 25 F.3d at 680.
13. Purket, 115 S. Ct. at 1770. "There were a total of four black persons available for
selection as jurors, making up 14% of the venire. The government used two of its six strikes
(33%) to eliminate two of the four black members of the venire. The defendant then used
one peremptory challenge to strike one of the two potential remaining black jurors, so that
the actual jury consisted of eleven whites and one black." State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d 772,
774 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
14. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
15. Id. "I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long
curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to not be
a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly,
unkept hair." Id. It is worth noting that the officer who arrested Elem on the night of the
robbery described Elem as having "french braids" in his hair. State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d at
773. Oddly, the prosecutor failed to mention this apparent similarity between Elem and juror
22 when explaining the challenge. Id.
16. Id. Jurors 22 and 24 were the only members of the jury panel with facial hair. Id.
at 774.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Without explanation, the state trial court overruled Elem's objections
and empaneled the jury.'9 The Missouri Court of Appeals, after considering
the challenges under Batson, upheld the trial court's decision.2" The court
held that the prosecutor's explanation for the challenges constituted a
legitimate "hunch" that failed to raise an inference of racial discrimination.2'
Elem then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court asserting the unconstitutionality of the peremptory challenges and other
claims.22 Adopting a magistrate judge's report, the district court found
factual support in the record for the Missouri courts' determination that there
had been no purposeful discrimination.23
While acknowledging that the previous robbery incident was a
sufficient reason for striking juror 24, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court on grounds that long hair, a
mustache, and a beard were insufficient reasons for striking juror 22.24 The
Eighth Circuit explained that "neutral explanations" alone, even if facially
legitimate, reasonably specific, and clear, failed to satisfy the Batson test.
25
The court held that where the prosecution strikes members of the defen-
dant's race from the venire citing factors facially irrelevant to jury service
qualification, there must be a plausible, race-neutral explanation of why
those factors affect the person's ability to serve as a juror.26
In reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that the prosecutor's explanation for striking juror 22 focused
on characteristics that were not peculiar *to Elem's ethnic group and was
therefore sufficiently nondiscriminatory.27 Further, noting support in the
record for the trial court determination that the explanation was not
pretextual, the Supreme Court held that the Batson requirements were met.28
19. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
20. State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d at 774-75.
21. Id. at 775.
22. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
23. Id.
24. Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d at 682-83.
25. Id. at 683.
26. Id.
27. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
28. Id. at 1771-72.
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Batson
Shortly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court decided Strauder v.
West Virginia,29 which recognized that criminal defendants are protected
against the discriminatory exclusion of members of their own race from the
venire." In Strauder, a black defendant sought to reverse his murder
conviction by attacking a state statute limiting jury service to white males.3
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction,32 holding that
denying blacks jury service violated equal protection principles recently
ratified by the Fourteenth Amendment.33
Despite this right to jury service, exclusion of blacks from actual petit
juries continued through more subtle means, including peremptory
challenges.34 The Supreme Court did not consider the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges, however, until it decided Swain v. Alabama35 almost
a century after Strauder.3 s
The Court may have been reluctant to question the use of discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges for two reasons.37 First, American jurisprudence
recognized peremptory challenges as a time-honored tradition valued by both
sides in criminal cases as an important element of fairness.38 Second,
29. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
30. Cheryl A. O'Brien, Note, Hernandez v. New York: Did the Supreme Court Intend
to Overrule Batson's Standard of "Racially Neutral"? 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 315, 319
(1993).
31. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304-05. The defendant claimed that exclusion of blacks from
service on grand or petit juries denied him "the full and equal benefit of all laws" enjoyed
by white defendants. Id. at 304 (quoting Defendant's pre-trial petition for removal to federal
court). Further, the defendant claimed that exclusion of blacks from jury service greatly
enhanced the probability that his rights would be denied more readily than would the rights
of a white defendant. Id.
32. Id. at 312.
33. Id. at 307. " [N]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court questioned "how can
it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury
drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race,
because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of
equal legal protection?" Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309.
34. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection:
Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511, 564.
35. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
36. Brand, supra note 34, at 564.
37. Brand, supra note 34, at 564.
38. Brand, supra note 34, at 564-65. The Court in Swain noted that the "function of
the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
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peremptory challenges constituted an integral part of the trial process, which
most legal minds considered a paradigm of impartiality incapable of
facilitating invidious racial discrimination.
39
Swain involved a black defendant who appealed his rape conviction by
arguing that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of all six eligible black
members from the venire violated his right to equal protection.4 ° In
rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court observed that peremptory challenges
historically required neither explanation nor control by the court.4 The
Court also stated that prosecutors are entitled to the presumption that their
strikes are based on acceptable considerations related to the case being tried,
the defendant involved, and the crime charged.42 Colorable Fourteenth
Amendment claims arose only upon a showing that a prosecutor actively
sought to strike peremptorily all qualified blacks from all juries.43 The
Court affirmed Swain's conviction because he failed to show that the
prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude systematically blacks from
jury panels over a period of time."
So formidable was this burden of proof that, over the next twenty
years, no lower court found that a criminal defendant sufficiently satisfied
the Swain test.45 The Supreme Court finally reconsidered Swain in 1986
when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that racially motivated
peremptory challenges violated a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
placed before them, and not otherwise." 380 U.S. at 219. See also supra note 1 and
accompanying text for discussion about the history of peremptory challenges.
39. Brand, supra note 34, at 565.
40. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-05.
41. Id. at 220-21.
42. Id. at 223; Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 21, 27 (1993) [hereinafter Johnson, The
Language and Culture].
43. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. The Court stated that "when the prosecutor in a county,
in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant
or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as
qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause, with
the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes
on added significance." Id. See also Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra note 42,
at 28.
44. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227-28.
45. Sheri L. Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611,
1658 & n.24 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson, Black Innocence] (citing United States v. Carter,
528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Pearson,
448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971); McKinney v. Walker, 394 F. Supp. 1015 (D.S.C. 1974); State
v. Simpson, 326 So. 2d 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.
1975); Ford v. State, 530 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10
(Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Ridley v. State, 475 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).
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right to an impartial jury.' Thus, ground was tilled for the landmark Batson
v. Kentucky.47
B. Batson and its Progeny
Batson involved a black defendant convicted by an all-white jury after
the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude all four black
members from the venire.48 Although the defendant claimed violation of
both his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court based
the decision solely on the equal protection claim.49 Moreover, the Court
little more than acknowledged the Strauder principle that discriminatory
peremptory challenges violated a defendant's equal protection right to have
members of his own race on the venire.5" The Court placed greater
emphasis on the equal protection rights of prospective black jurors that
might be excluded peremptorily from petit juries and the damage such
discrimination would cause to the entire community.51
Reversing the defendant's conviction, the Court held that the equal
protection clause forbids prosecutors from challenging prospective jurors
solely because of their race or on the assumption that black jurors will be
unable to serve impartially at trials involving black defendants. 52 The Court
clearly rejected the Swain presumption that black jurors will be biased in
favor of black defendants.53 Batson also obviated the need for defendants
to prove systematic discrimination by prosecutors in establishing equal
protection violations.'
46. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986). For further analysis of this case, see Johnson, Black
Innocence, supra note 45, at 1663-66; Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra note 42,
at 28-29. The Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
47. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See also Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra note 42,
at 29.
48. 476 U.S. at 82-83.
49. Id. at 83-84. See also Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra note 42, at 29.
50. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308-09).
51. Id. at 87-89.
52. Id. at 89. See also Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra note 42, at 29.
53. Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra note 42, at 29-30. However, in
concentrating on the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the jurors instead of the Sixth
Amendment rights of defendants, the Court's decision in Batson "underplays prior rationales
relating to the defendant's interest in non-racist determination of his guilt and exaggerates
precedent related to juror rights and community interests." Johnson, The Language and
Culture, supra note 42, at 32.
54. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93. The Court conceded that the Swain requirement that
defendants provide "proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was... a
[Vol. 19
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In replacing the prohibitive requirements of Swain, the Court fashioned
a three-part test for determining when a prosecutor's peremptory challenges
violate the equal protection clause." Instead of proving systematic
discrimination by the prosecutor over a long period of time,56 an opponent
suspecting biased peremptory challenges must first establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination in the case at hand. 7 To establish a prima
facie case, the defendant must prove membership in a cognizable racial
group58 and show that the prosecutor peremptorily excluded members of the
defendant's race from the jury.59  From the facts and other relevant
circumstances, the defendant must draw an inference that the prosecutor has
used discriminatory practices in selecting the jury.'
If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden of
proof shifts to the proponent of the peremptory challenges to show that the
challenges constitute race-neutral strikes and relate to the case to be tried.61
Although this second step does not require as much explanation as a
challenge for cause, the prosecutor cannot rebut the defendant's prima facie
case by merely asserting a hunch that the challenged juror would be biased
in favor of the defendant due to "shared race."62 If the prosecutor tenders
a race-neutral explanation related to the case at bar, the trial court under-
takes the third step of the Batson test and decides whether the opponent of
the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.63
crippling burden" that made prosecutors' peremptory challenges "largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny." Id.
55. Id. at 96-98.
56. Id. at 91-92. Indeed," [a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not
immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable
decisions."' Id. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 n,14 (1977)).
57. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. The Court emphasized that the burden of proof in an equal
protection case is "on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire to
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.'" Id. at 93 (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545, 550 (1967)).
58. Id. at 96 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)).
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court invested trial courts with a great deal of discretion in evaluating the
circumstances surrounding peremptory challenge controversies. For example, a " pattern' of
strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference
of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire
examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of
discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. The Court expressed "confidence that
trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances
concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of
discrimination against black jurors." Id. at 97.
61. Id. at 97-98.
62. Id. at 97.
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
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The Court further concentrated on the State's argument that restricting
the use of peremptory challenges would "eviscerate" the fair trial protections
they afford.' The Court stated that, despite the advantages of peremptory
challenges in the justice system, the challenges often discriminate against
black venirepersons in contravention of the equal protection guarantees in
the Fourteenth Amendment.65
The Supreme Court soon extended the Batson rationale to other
situations involving discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. In Powers
v. Ohio,' the Court acknowledged the standing of a criminal defendant to
object to discriminatory peremptory challenges regardless of his race.67 In
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,68 the Court extended the prohibition
against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges to civil cases.69
Although the Court in Batson specifically declined to address whether the
Constitution limited a defendant's use of peremptory challenges, in Georgia
v. McCullom,70 the Court held that criminal defendants could not engage in
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. 71 More recently, the Court
extended Batson to prohibit peremptory challenges motivated by gender
discrimination in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 72
Lurking among the post-Batson cases, however, lies Hernandez v. New
York,73 the first case to concentrate on the actual application of Batson.74 In
Hernandez, the Court clarified that protection against racially motivated
peremptory challenges depends upon proof of discriminatory intent on the
part of the prosecutor.7 ' Hernandez involved a Latino defendant who
appealed his conviction for attempted murder and weapon possession by
claiming that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude
Latinos from the jury.76 In explaining the strikes, the prosecutor stated that
64. Id.
65. Id. at 98-99.
66. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
67. Id. at 415 ("To bar petitioner's claim because his race differs from that of the
excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor,
and privilege of jury service.").
68. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
69. Id. at 628. "Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the
idea of democratic government from becoming a reality." Id. (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 556 (1979); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
70. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
71. Id. at 59.
72. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
73. 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion).
74. Id. at 355 (plurality opinion). See also Johnson, The Language and Culture, supra
note 42, at 52.
75. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60.
76. Id. at 355.
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Latino jurors might not accept the interpreter's translation of testimony
offered by Spanish-speaking witnesses.77
The Court upheld the conviction and specified that the defendant failed
to establish that the prosecutor's strikes were motivated by either an
intention to exclude Latino jurors or stereotypical assumptions about
Latinos.78  Both the plurality and concurring opinions deemed the
prosecutor's explanation race-neutral because a factor other than race served
as the basis for the strikes.79
Thus, six justices supported the assertion that a prosecutor's peremptory
challenges are presumed to be race-neutral unless discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation of the strikes.80 In dissent Justice
Stevens mentioned, but did not emphasize, the language in Batson requiring
that a prosecutor's reason for striking prospective jurors be" legitimate,'...
and related to the particular case to be tried."'" This language, however,
constituted the main issue in Purkett v. Elem.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
Although brief by Supreme Court standards, the Purkett decision
concisely distinguished the second and third steps of the Batson test.82 In
doing so, the Court emphasized the separation between the prosecutor's
responsibility to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
challenge and the trial court's responsibility to decide whether the oppo-
nent of the challenge proved purposeful racial discrimination.83
77. Id. at 356-57.
78. ld. at'361.
79. Id. at 361 (plurality opinion); 500 U.S. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In fact,
Justice O'Connor authored her concurrence to voice concern that Justice Kennedy's opinion
might require more justification by the prosecutor for strikes that had a disproportionate
impact on particular racial groups. Id. at 372-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor emphasized that Court precedent clearly rejected the proposition that a law or act,
" without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional
solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."' Id. at 373 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).
80. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. Justice Kennedy emphasized that the second step of
Batson required only that the prosecutor's explanation for peremptory challenges be facially
valid. Id. at 360.
81. Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98,
& n.20 (1986)). Justice Stevens instead pursued the argument of whether disproportionate
impact was sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation. Id. at 376-79 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent likewise emphasized Justice Stevens's dispro-
portionate impact argument. Id. at 375 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771-72. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text for
an explanation of the Batson test.
83. 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71.
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Writing per curiam,' the Supreme Court found that the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously combined the second and third steps
by "requiring that the justification [for the challenge] tendered at the
second step be not just [race]-neutral, but also at least minimally persua-
sive . . .." The Court clarified that the persuasiveness of the justification
becomes relevant only when the trial court undertakes the third step of
determining whether the opponent of the sirike carried the burden of
proving purposeful discrimination.8 6 At that stage, the trial court decides
whether the justification is so implausible, fantastic, or silly as to simply
constitute a pretext for discrimination.87 The Court reasoned that ending
the Batson test at the second step would shift improperly the burden of
persuasion regarding racial motivation away from the opponent of the
challenge.8
The Court then interpreted the language in Batson, which requires a
prosecutor to explain a peremptory challenge. 9 Specifically, the Court's
comment in Batson, that the reason must be related to the case at bar,
meant only that a prosecutor could not satisfy the burden of explanation
by merely asserting good faith or merely denying any discriminatory
motivation for the challenge."
In dissent, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's wisdom in
apparently altering the second step of Batson without first ordering full
briefing or oral argument on the merits of Elem's case.91 Justice Stevens
insisted that the majority partially overruled Batson by essentially nullify-
ing step two, which requires peremptory challenges to be trial related as
well as race-neutral and reasonably specific.9' If not directly related to
the particular case to be tried, a prosecutor could easily adopt "rote"
84. Per curiam is Latin for "by the Court," and is defined as "[a] phrase used to
distinguish an opinion of the whole court from an opinion written by any one judge.
Sometimes it denotes an . . .announcement of the disposition of a case by court not
accompanied by a written opinion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
85. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771 (citing Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir.
1994)).
86. Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359 (plurality opinion)).
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).
89. Id.
90. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. See also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359-60; cf. Texas
Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981) ("The explanation
provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant.").
91. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92, Id. at 1774 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98).
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neutral explanations that, while facially legitimate, conceal discriminatory
intent.93
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The per curiam nature of Purkett v. Elem initially left commentators
guessing about the majority's message. Some interpreted the decision as
signaling a present unwillingness by the Court to further extend the
protections in Batson.94 Still others felt that the manner of the decision
might simply indicate the Court's view that Purkett had not been a
particularly important case. 9
Practitioners were quick to look past the manner of the decision and
focus on the holding itself.96 In the eyes of one defense lawyer, the Purkett
decision heightened the criminal defendant's burden of proving intentional
discrimination to the extent that Batson protections would be contingent on
proving "'what's in the prosecutor's mind." '97 Prosecutors, on the other
hand, hailed Purkett as a "'restate[ment]' of the basic principles behind
traditional peremptory challenges, which required no explanation whatso-
ever.
98
In deferring analysis of peremptory challenges until the third step of
Batson, however, the greatest impact of Purkett must surely be felt by the
trial court.99 In the view of one local jurist, Purkett definitely weakens
Batson." Although Purkett emphasized the trial court's discretion in
determining purposeful discrimination, it failed to provide any "real
guidelines for weighing a Batson objection.''.
In view of every post-Batson decision except Hernandez, Purkett must
be considered a colossal step backward for equal protection. In fact, the
93. Id. at 1773 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 65
(Mo. 1987) (en banc)).
94. Marcia Coyle, Justices Come Up for Air on Juror Strikes, NAT'L L.J., May 29,
1995, at A14.
95. Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Gives Prosecutors More Leeway in Challenging
Juror, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1995, at B4.
96. Richard C. Reuben, Excuses, Excuses, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 20.
97. Id. (quoting Gary Buichard, a public defense lawyer from Atlanta). Mr. Buichard
further asserted that, "[u]nless you have a prosecutor who messes up badly, you're never
going to get that kind of proof." Id.
98. Id. (quoting Kent Scheidegger, "legal director for the pro-prosecution Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation in Sacramento, California").
99. Interview with Hon. William R. Wilson Jr., United States District Court, Eastern
District of Arkansas, in Little Rock, Ark. (Mar. 18, 1996).
100. Id.
101. Id. "We'll have to wait and see," Judge Wilson continued, "but I suspect, as a
practical matter, Batson has been overruled." Id.
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Court's reasoning in Purkett almost mirrors the reasoning in Strauder v.
Virginia. Both decisions ostensibly champion principles of equal protection
while simultaneously making those principles vulnerable to judicial abuse.
Although Strauder prohibited exclusion of blacks from the venire, it
took almost a century, and Swain v. Alabama, for the Court to prohibit
discriminatory peremptory challenges that excluded blacks from petit juries.
One reason for this delay may have been overconfidence in judicial
administration of equal protection.'0 2 Recognition of this overconfidence is
apparent in the Swain test and its extra-judicial means for determining the
existence of equal protection violations.
103
In Purkett the Court suffers from the same overconfidence in the
judiciary. Without guidelines to determine when a prosecutor's explanation
is actually a pretext for intentional discrimination, a criminal defendant bears
the heavy burden of producing evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory
state of mind. This standard is arguably equivalent to that necessary under
the prohibitive Swain test.) 4
A foreshadowing of Purkett's troublesome potential lies within Justice
Marshall's Batson concurrence.0 5 While agreeing that racially discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges violate equal protection, Justice Marshall
cautioned the Court to be careful in setting the criteria by which lower
courts should determine discriminatory intent.'0 s  Due to their own
"conscious or unconscious racism," judges themselves may accept such
explanations as sufficient.'0 7
Prophetically, Justice Marshall noted that, even after a century of equal
protection, the face of racial discrimination in the United States had changed
very little.108 It is difficult to believe that society or the judiciary has made
sufficient progress since 1986 to warrant a return to the idealistic, yet
unrealistic, rule in Strauder. Unfortunately, such is the reasoning of Purkett.
102. See Brand, supra note 34; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for explanation of the Swain test.
104. See supra note 43.
105. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-08 (Marshall, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 105-07 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted that "[a]ny
prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are
ill equipped to second-guess those reasons." Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
107. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 106-07 (Marshall, J., concurring). "It is worth remembering that 114 years
after the close of the War Between the States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and
other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the administration of justice as in
our society as a whole."' Id. (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 264 (1986)) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1979)).
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Both cases exalt an equal protection right in name only because the remedy
provided is now practically unattainable.
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